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Going with the Grain of Cognition:
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Build Support for Childhood
Vaccination
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Childhood vaccination is widely considered to be one of themost successful public health
interventions. Yet, the effective delivery of vaccination depends upon public willingness to
vaccinate. Recently, many countries have faced problems with vaccine hesitancy, where
a growing number of parents perceive vaccination to be unsafe or unnecessary, leading
some to delay or refuse vaccines for their children. Effective intervention strategies for
countering this problem are currently sorely lacking, however. Here, we propose that
this may be because existing strategies are grounded more in intuition than insights
from psychology. Consequently, such strategies are sometimes at variance with basic
psychological principles and assumptions. By going against the grain of cognition,
such strategies potentially run the risk of undermining persuasive efforts to reduce
vaccine hesitancy. We demonstrate this by drawing on key insights from cognitive
and social psychology to show how various known features of human psychology can
lead many intuitively appealing intervention strategies to backfire, yielding unintended
and undesirable repercussions. We conclude with a summary of potential avenues
of investigation that may be more effective in addressing vaccine hesitancy. Our key
message is that intervention strategies must be crafted that go with the grain of cognition
by incorporating key insights from the psychological sciences.
Keywords: backfire effect, information-deficit-model, intervention development, vaccination, vaccine hesitancy,
vaccine confidence
INTRODUCTION
Childhood vaccination is a safe and effective way of reducing infectious diseases. Yet in many
countries, there has been a decline in public confidence surrounding vaccination, leading some
parents to delay or refuse vaccines for their children (Dubé et al., 2013). While rates of vaccination
coverage remain generally high, such vaccine hesitancy is a significant cause for concern, since
geographical clustering of vaccine refusal has recently contributed to outbreaks of diseases
previously considered eradicated or controlled (Omer et al., 2008). In response to growing vaccine
hesitancy, there has been an upsurge in research that has tracked the psychological, social, and
contextual variables that contribute to vaccine hesitancy (Larson et al., 2014). However, while the
drivers of vaccine hesitancy are well documented, effective intervention strategies for addressing the
issue are sorely lacking (Sadaf et al., 2013; Dubé et al., 2015). Here, we argue that this may be because
existing strategies have been guided more by intuition than by insights from psychology and by the
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erroneous assumption that humans act rationally (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003). We highlight the
potential pitfalls of this approach by providing examples where
interventions based on these assumptions have backfired; discuss
why they backfired; and consider how such backfire effects might
be averted. We propose that efforts to spur vaccination must go
with the grain of cognition—they must be grounded in insights
from psychology regarding how people think and act.
DEFINING VACCINE HESITANCY
While there has been some disagreement in the literature
regarding the exact definition of vaccine hesitancy, recently,
in an effort to provide a standardized global definition, the
World Health Organization SAGE working group on vaccine
hesitancy settled on the following interpretation—“the delay
or refusal of vaccination, despite the availability of vaccine
services” (MacDonald, 2015). They identified three different
drivers of vaccine hesitancy—complacency resulting from low
risk perceptions of vaccine preventable diseases; a lack of
convenience arising from insufficient access to vaccine services;
and low confidence due to concerns about the safety of
vaccines and the legitimacy of the services that deliver them
(the “3Cs” model). While complacency and convenience are
important reasons for vaccine hesitancy that merit psychological
investigation, here we focus on hesitancy based on confidence
(see Betsch et al., 2015, for a broader review), which
encompasses uncertainty about the safety and effectiveness of
vaccines, a lack of trust in the systems that deliver vaccines,
and doubt about the motives of policy-makers who decide
on the required vaccines. We focus on confidence because
we regard it as a tipping point toward vaccine refusal or
acceptance.
GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN OF
COGNITION
It is a shortcoming of many existing intervention strategies
that they are grounded more in intuition than insights from
psychology. Traditionally, for example, most strategies for raising
confidence in immunization have been based on the so-called
Information DeficitModel (IDM) of science communication. This
model is predicated on the assumption that humans are rational
and public misconceptions of science arise due to insufficient
knowledge. On this approach, the solution to vaccine hesitancy
is to provide hesitant parents with more scientific facts in order
to plug the “knowledge gap” that is presumed to be the barrier
preventing them from vaccinating their children. Given the
widespread myths and misinformation surrounding childhood
vaccination (Betsch et al., 2010; Kata, 2010; Jolley and Douglas,
2014), it is easy to see the intuitive appeal of this approach. The
IDM is flawed, however—knowledge is rarely a good predictor
of vaccination acceptance, and interventions that seek to inform
or educate hesitant parents have little or no impact on vaccine
confidence (Sadaf et al., 2013; Dubé et al., 2015; Jarrett et al.,
2015).
A different approach is therefore required—one that is
grounded in insights from psychology, rather than intuition.
Intervention developers must recognize that there are complex
cognitive, social, and affective processes that need to be
taken into consideration when crafting interventions. As we
show next, intervention strategies that disregard these complex
psychological processes—such as those based on the IDM—
may not merely be ineffective in their capacity to sway hesitant
parents, they may even inadvertently increase their resistance to
vaccination.Table 1 provides a concise overview of these backfire
effects, which form the basis of our foregoing analysis. The
fourth and fifth columns of the table summarize, respectively, the
degree of evidence for theses backfire effects (+, weak evidence;
++, moderate evidence; + + +, strong evidence) and whether
this evidence is direct (viz. observed in a vaccination context),
indirect (viz. observed in a context other than vaccination), or a
combination of the two.
Cognitive Constraints
Research in cognitive psychology shows that because of various
biases of human memory, simply refuting vaccination myths
and communicating scientific facts can backfire. For example,
in order to debunk a myth, it seems logical to expose people
to the myth so they know what you are referring to. Indeed, a
common strategy for highlighting false information is to present
myths juxtaposed with relevant facts. In one study examining
the efficacy of such an approach, people were presented with
a flyer displaying both myths and facts about the flu vaccine.
Immediately after presentation, people could accurately separate
the myths from the facts. Yet, 30 min later, most people had
difficulties determining which of the statements about the flu
vaccine were myths or facts (Skurnik et al., 2005). Dubbed
the familiarity backfire effect, it seems that exposure to the
myth can actually increase familiarity with the misinformation,
paradoxically increasing the likelihood that people will recall it
and assume it to be true (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
Another example of how the mere mention of a vaccine
myth can undermine informational interventions was reported
by Nyhan et al. (2014). In their study, parents were presented
with a passage taken from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention correcting the widespread myth that the measles,
mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine causes autism. Although
myth-debunking reduced belief in the false claims, it also
paradoxically decreased vaccination intent amongst those least
favorable toward vaccination.
It is also possible to elicit the overkill backfire effect when
attempting to correct misinformation. While it may seem
intuitive to present many counterarguments to debunk a myth,
processing many arguments is more cognitively taxing than
processing a few, which renders it less likely that the information
will be integrated into individuals’ mental models, especially
when compared to a simple and compelling myth (Schwarz et al.,
2007; Cook and Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
Social Motivations
Attempts to change parental attitudes regarding vaccination
by simply presenting people with scientific facts also overlook
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TABLE 1 | Summary of backfire effects.
Backfire effect Brief description References Evidence? Source
Familiarity backfire
effect
Repeated exposure to misinformation can increase an
individuals familiarity with that misinformation, potentially
leading them to assume it to be true.
Skurnik et al., 2005 + Direct
Overkill backfire
effect
When attempting to correct misinformation, conveying
many counterarguments is cognitively taxing and can
potentially lead people to reject the alternative
explanation being advocated in favor of a simpler
account based on the misinformation.
Schwarz et al., 2007 + Indirect
Attitude
polarization
backfire effect
When confronted with belief-incongruent information,
people tend to selectively call to mind evidence and
arguments in opposition to this information, leading them
to cling to their original beliefs even stronger than before.
Lord et al., 1979; Ditto and
Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 2009;
Kahan et al., 2010
+++ Direct + indirect
Sacred values
backfire effect
When attitudes or beliefs are viewed as sacred—or as
part of one’s deeply held beliefs—monetary incentives or
disincentives to change behavior tend to engender moral
outrage and greater resistance to the behavior being
advocated.
Tetlock, 2003; Ginges et al.,
2007; Berns et al., 2012
++ Indirect
Social norms
backfire effect
Highlighting an undesirable behavior as being regrettably
frequent can backfire by communicating a descriptive
norm signaling that the behavior is common, and
therefore normal and approved of by others.
Cialdini et al., 1990; Cialdini,
2003; Cialdini et al., 2006
+++ Indirect
Group directed
threat backfire
effect
Messages that criticize a particular group—such as
vaccine hesitant parents—can lead that group to show
stronger group affiliation and greater resistance to
out-group recommendations.
Ellemers et al., 2002 +++ Indirect
Fear appeals
backfire effect
Persuasive messages that induce fear to encourage
individuals to accept the messages’ recommendations
can potentially backfire by triggering defensive and
avoidant responses.
Peters et al., 2013; Nyhan et al.,
2014; Ruiter et al., 2014
++ Direct + indirect
basic findings from social psychology. Psychologists have long
demonstrated that people are motivated to defend and justify
their pre-existing beliefs, even if those beliefs are in conflict
with a wealth of evidence. Therefore, merely presenting evidence
in favor of vaccination is unlikely to change attitudes because
people engage in motivated reasoning—the tendency to search
for information in support of—and disregard evidence in conflict
with—one’s prior beliefs (Lord et al., 1979; Ditto and Lopez, 1992;
Ditto et al., 2009). Moreover, presenting information that clashes
with people’s worldviews can also lead to a backfire effect due to
attitude polarization—when confronted with belief-incongruent
information, people tend to selectively call to mind evidence and
arguments in opposition to this information, leading them to
cling to their original beliefs even stronger than before (Lord
et al., 1979). There is some research demonstrating that people
engage in motivated reasoning about vaccination. In a study of
public acceptance of evidence regarding the HPV vaccine, people
were more likely to discredit information about the safety and
effectiveness of the vaccine when the information was framed in
a way that clashed with their pre-existing worldviews (Kahan et
al., 2010).
A similar line of research speaks to the caution that should be
exercised when introducing monetary incentives or disincentives
to advocate vaccination. Much public policy assumes that people
are fundamentally creatures of the marketplace and can be
encouraged to change their behavior if offered a financial motive.
Yet, when behavior (such as refusing vaccination) is grounded
in one’s deeply held beliefs, it tends to be viewed as a moral
rule that cannot be violated, rather than a preference that can be
subject to cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, research shows that when
people are asked to trade off their moral values for instrumental
rewards they react with moral outrage and become even less
likely to engage in the desired behavior (Tetlock, 2003; Ginges
et al., 2007; Berns et al., 2012). These insights are particularly
noteworthy in light of moves by various governments to withhold
welfare payments or restrict access to other goods and services
from parents who choose not to vaccinate their children. It may
be that the introduction of monetary value to what is otherwise
viewed as a moral issue has the potential to lead vaccine hesitant
parents to become more entrenched in their beliefs. There is
very recent evidence from an experimental setting showing
that perceived coercion may have unintended consequences on
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vaccination rates. In a simulation of vaccine decision making,
compulsory vaccination increased the level of moral outrage
among those already opposed to vaccination and led vaccine
hesitant individuals to be less likely to voluntarily vaccinate in
subsequent iterations of the vaccine decision making paradigm
(Betsch and Böhm, 2015).
Another pitfall of countless public health campaigns is the
tendency to highlight a problem behavior as being regrettably
frequent e.g., “parents are increasingly becoming distrustful of
childhood vaccines.” This approach overlooks the basic tendency
for people to act in accordance with social norms—people’s
perceptions of which behaviors are frequently performed.
Therefore, highlighting the extent of a problem can backfire by
inadvertently communicating a social norm drawing attention to
the fact that the undesired behavior is engaged in bymany people,
and is therefore appropriate and normal (Cialdini et al., 1990;
Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini et al., 2006). Indeed, studies in numerous
contexts show that when people overestimate the prevalence and
degree of social approval of undesirable behaviors (e.g., binge
drinking) it increases the likelihood that they will engage in
the undesirable social conduct (Schultz et al., 2007). It may be
that recent public campaigns highlighting vaccine hesitancy as a
growing problem have led people to overestimate the extent to
which parents actually distrust vaccines, thereby decreasing their
own confidence.
Insights from social identity theory further demonstrate the
powerful influence of social context and group allegiances on
behavior. People form an important part of their self-esteem
from the social groups they belong to and identify with (Tajfel
and Turner, 2004). When people feel that a group they identify
with has been evaluated negatively, those who are highly
committed to the group are likely to demonstrate even stronger
group affiliation, display expressions of in-group loyalty, and
a heightened willingness for collective action (Ellemers et al.,
2002). This becomes problematic because it seems likely that
social identities may be formed around opposition to vaccination,
or at least more broadly around the adoption of an alternative
lifestyle and questioning of the medical status quo (Attwell
and Freeman, 2015; Leask, 2015). Therefore, interventions that
explicitly deride vaccine hesitant parents or pit vaccinating
parents against non-vaccinating parents may do more damage
than good by threatening the group identities of those opposed
to vaccination, thereby leading them to rally together and cling
to their beliefs more strongly than before.
Emotional Responses
Another pervasive and intuitively appealing tactic for behavior
change is the use of fear appeals. This approach is based on the
assumption that if people fear the consequences of their risky
behaviors, then they will be motivated to adopt safer alternatives.
This logic seems particularly fitting in the context of vaccination,
given that vaccines have become a “victim of their own success”—
since the diseases prevented by vaccination have been reduced or
eliminated, the dangers they pose are less salient than the risks of
side-effects from vaccines.
Themost recent and comprehensive meta-analytic assessment
of the fear appeal literature concluded that fear appeals do work
(Tannenbaum et al., 2015). However, fear appeals can potentially
induce negative effects, since threatening health information
can trigger defensive responses, such as risk denial, biased
information processing, or inattention to health promotion
messages (Peters et al., 2013). Moreover, such defensive and
avoidant responses may occur disproportionately among those
individuals most at risk from failing to engage in the desired
health behavior (van’t Riet et al., 2010). The possibility of a fear
appeal backfiringmay be increased if audiences perceive that they
are unable to effectively adopt the messages’ recommendations
(Witte and Allen, 2000).
That fear appeals can sometimes be counterproductive is
supported by the results of the study by Nyhan et al. (2014)
who presented parents with fear appeals consisting of either a
dramatic narrative of a child that contracts measles or a graphic
picture of a child with measles. Paradoxically, both appeals led
parents to express greater—rather than reduced—fear of side-
effects from vaccination, compared with parents who were not
exposed to a fear appeal. This result suggests it may be unwise
to use threatening communications alone to combat vaccine
hesitancy.
GOINGWITH THE GRAIN OF COGNITION
The number of possible backfire effects can paint a disheartening
picture. Yet, there is also a wealth of psychological literature
outlining optimal ways to design interventions to effectively
shift behavior that may be relevant to vaccine hesitancy. Given
what we know about how people’s attitudes and decisions are
systematically influenced by (1) how they remember information,
(2) their group identities and deeply held beliefs, and (3) their
emotional responses, effective interventions to build confidence
in childhood vaccination can potentially be crafted to harness
these fundamental aspects of human psychology.
For example, there are various debiasing techniques that can
be used to correct myths surrounding vaccination (Cook and
Lewandowsky, 2011). In order to avoid the familiarity backfire
effect, it is best to begin by stating the facts; then introduce
the myth; then debunk it; and finally replace the myth with
a scientific fact. Crucially, the myth should never be repeated.
Similarly, to avoid the overkill backfire effect, communicators
should present a few—rather than many—counterarguments to
a myth, since numerous counterarguments take more cognitive
effort to process, thus reducing the potency of the correction. It is
encouraging to note that these findings have been incorporated
into recommendations by the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDPC, 2014). However, there is
currently no work that has directly tested these insights in
the vaccination space, so their effectiveness in an experimental
setting remains to be seen.
Other approaches suggest bypassing the facts altogether. For
example, messages couched in terms of an individual’s pre-
existing beliefs and values are more likely to shift attitudes
than those that are incongruent with their values (Kahan, 2010;
Feinberg and Willer, 2013; Day et al., 2014). Opposition to
vaccination tends to be based on a preference for a natural,
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alternative lifestyle, and the belief that governments should not
intrude into one’s personal life (Mills et al., 2005; Brown et al.,
2010; Kata, 2010). It may be possible to redefine vaccination as
congruent with such values. There is some promising work in
this vein. A community based intervention found that framing
vaccination as congruent with an alternative lifestyle led some
parents lacking confidence in vaccination to feel more positively
toward it (Attwell and Freeman, 2015). Future studies should
further test the effectiveness of such an approach.
It may also be possible to take advantage of people’s tendency
to act in accordance with perceived social norms. In recent years,
there has been an upsurge in social norms marketing campaigns
which have harnessed the tendency for people to look to others
for cues about the appropriate and correct ways to behave
in order to promote socially desirable conduct. Interventions
that seek to correct people’s misperceptions of the prevalence
and degree of social approval of deleterious behaviors such as
drinking, smoking, energy consumption, littering, and gambling
have proven very successful (Schultz et al., 2007; Moreira et
al., 2009). Despite growing parental concern, vaccination rates
are still high in most communities (90–95%). Communicating
this high level of community endorsement may be an effective
approach for leveraging support for vaccination. Research on
social identity theory further suggests the conditions under which
normative messages may be most potent. For example, if a
counter-attitudinal message is communicated by an in-group
source it is more likely to be accepted (Cohen, 2003).
Finally, it may be possible to use fear appeals productively—
whilst at the same time avoiding the potential for such
threatening communications to backfire—by incorporating a
message component that induces positive emotions. Previous
research suggests there are two ways in which this might be
accomplished. Firstly, by incorporating a powerful self efficacy
promoting element that persuades the message recipient that
they are capable of adopting the fear appeal’s recommendations
(Ruiter et al., 2014; Tannenbaum et al., 2015), and secondly
by getting message recipients to self-affirm by listing positive
attributes about themselves or reflecting on their own cherished
values (Sherman et al., 2000; Harris et al., 2007). It would be
valuable to establish whether such augmentations of fear based
messages might be effective motivators in the context of vaccine
hesitancy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Too often, strategies to raise confidence in childhood vaccination
ignore key insights from psychology. This is problematic because,
as we have shown here, by disregarding such insights many
common and intuitively appealing intervention strategies may
inadvertently do more harm than good. Our strategies must go
with the grain of cognition—they must be crafted in a way that
acknowledges how people actually think and act, rather than how
they ought to. In the same way that vaccination programmes
rely on rigorous medical science, so too should vaccination
interventions be informed by the best available evidence from the
psychological sciences. Of course there are noteworthy instances
where psychology has been incorporated into recommendations
for communicating with vaccine hesitant parents (ECDPC, 2014;
Betsch et al., 2015). Nevertheless, there remains a pressing need
to build a strong empirical base of psychologically grounded
intervention strategies that can inform efforts to counter vaccine
hesitancy.
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